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Research Goals and BLUF
Goals:
1. Dissect the shipboard industrial 
fire safety problem, including 
acquisition system influences
2. Develop a Safety Management 
System (SMS) framework for 
Shipboard Industrial Fire Safety 
based on the Complex System 
Governance (CSG) reference 
model
BLUF:
Rather than the current state of 
rote compliance (or noncompliance) 
to general requirements, 
contractual requirements for 
shipboard industrial fire safety 
should be data driven and vary 
based on risk. There should be 
clear technical authority over 
setting these requirements and 
technical cognizance in ensuring 
they are met.
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Dissecting the Problem – Sociotechnical 
Safety Perspective on Risk





































































Risk: the occurrences of some specified consequences of the activity and associated uncertainties
Cynefin Framework
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Complicated: The work done by the 
welding engineer to determine the 
welding requirements and produce the 
technical work documents for a 
particular work evolution.
Complex: Interaction between 
welding (hot work) and the 
surrounding environment. 
Factors such as type of 
welding, proximity to 
combustibles, fire resistant 
and non fire-resistant 
separations, and adequacy of 
the fire watch all contribute to 
the safe execution of this work 
evolution.
Clear: Skilled work (tasks) 
performed by a welder. 
Chaotic: Introducing a transient 
and unequally trained workforce 
with a few workers that may 
randomly decide to follow no rules 
into ship repair work evolutions. 
While emergence between sub-
systems in the shipboard fire 
safety problem should be 
discernable, this is only possible 
when all agents are playing by an 
identifiable and uniform set of 
rules.
Confused: From a programmatic standpoint, this is the current domain of shipboard industrial fire safety.
Navy Safety Management System 
(SMS) Framework
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• Leadership










• Sharing Best Practices 
and Lessons Learned








• Sharing Best Practices 
and Lessons Learned
• Informed Safety Culture
PROMOTION RISK MANAGEMENT ASSURANCE
• Risk Monitoring
• Change Management
Four Pillars of a Navy SMS and Fundamental Elements
Complex System Governance Model
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M5 – Echelon 2
Policy and 
identity
Sets Policy with 
Stakeholders
M5* – System 
Context and 
scanning









impact of fire and 
fire safety on the 
program
M3 Operations














M4' Learning and 
Transformation
Designs new 
learning or system 
transforms


















































3. Weaknesses in Defense-in-
Depth
4. Lags in Incorporating 
Lessons Learned into 
Contracts
5. Contract Requirements are 
not Driven by Data
Conclusion:
There is not currently a 
uniform level of industrial 
fire safety during ship 
maintenance availabilities, 
primarily because there is 
not currently a cohesive 
governance model or 
framework that is driving 
specificity of requirements to 
manage risk. 
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